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Theoretical underpinning
At the conclusion of the 20th century, the corporation
cemented itself as the dominant business model around
the world. The ability to raise large sums of money from
the public, legal personality and transnational commercial
activities had helped to reaffirm the company model as
the most debated issue in commercial law.1 Their
increased acquisition of wealth and power meant that
national governments had to put in place regulatory
frameworks to ensure that companies function in the
interest of the state. However, while most national
governments were able to respond to corporate
malpractices with overwhelming logic through the
imposition of corporate laws, at international level
corporations have been allowed to operate with limited
legal constraint notwithstanding the fact that multinational
corporations (MNCs) are a global phenomenon.2 An
escalation in human rights abuses and international torts
committed by MNCs has led to a vibrant debate over the
sustainability of our current international legal order in
which transnational corporate malpractices are shielded
from themoderating force of international law.3A cogent
example is the recently documented conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where in excess of 80
MNCs, all from industrialised nations, were implicated
in an array of illegal dealings and war crimes.4 However,
the interface betweenMNCs and human rights violations
is not new and can be traced back to the dawn of the
colonial era.5 Treaties of capitulation and concessions
contracts signed during the colonial period placed no
limitations on corporate power, culminating in organised
exploitation and abuse of both physical and human
resources.6Although decolonisation led to the introduction
of voluntary codes of conduct, these have been replaced
by “rapid globalisation of the laissez-faireworld market”7
and corporate strategic decision-making premised on
shareholder value maximisation.
Today, MNCs participate in 70% of all global trade,
produce 25% of the world’s goods, and employ as many
as 90 million people.8 However, flowing directly from
such positions of economic influence,MNCs also exercise
considerable political leverage in both domestic and
international spheres.9 As a result, it has become
increasingly difficult to monitor MNC activities and thus
hold them to account for malpractices and human rights
violations.10 There are many reasons for this, and the first
concerns the issue of jurisdiction. The transnational nature
of MNCs activities has enabled them to operate in
multiple jurisdictions, and some of these jurisdictions are
ill equipped to properly monitor and maintain minimum
standards of treatment.11 Moreover, MNCs are notorious
for outsourcing their activities to less developed countries
so as to benefit from their weak regulations, which attract
1The term “corporations” or “enterprises” is used with regard to legal persons profiting from commercial or governmental activities. In relation to “multinational corporations”,
this article adopts the definition of “transnational corporations” as is laid out in the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” as “an economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more
countries—whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively”. See UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
2Nora Gotzmann, “Legal Personality of the Corporation and International Criminal Law: Globalisation, Corporate Human Rights Abuses and the Rome Statute” (2008)
1(1) Q.L.S.R. 38; Jennifer A. Zerk,Multinationals and CSR: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.1
(traditionally, international law played a role only in relation to rights and responsibilities of states. Non-state actors such as corporations are relatively new to the scene.)
3 J. Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons of Bhopal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business Multinational
Corporations and Human Rights (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2013), p.xv.
4David Weissbrodt, “Business and Human Rights” (2005) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 55, 57.
5Omolafi Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law: Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries (Abingdon: Routledge Research in
Corporate Law, 2011), p.20.
6 See K.J. Vandevelde, “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” (2005) 12(1) UC Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 157; E.M. Borchard,
“Limitations on Coercive Protection” (1927) 21 A.J.I.L. 303; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (New York and London: Oxford University
Press, 1963), pp.14–30; and Steven R. Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 11 Yale Law Journal 443, 452.
7Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights” (2001) 11 Yale Law Journal 443, 452–458.
8Weissbrodt, “Business and Human Rights” (2005) 74University of Cincinnati Law Review 55, 59;Medard Gabel and Henry Bruner,Global Inc.: An Atlas of theMultinational
Corporation (New York: The New Press, 2003), p.5 (citing “A Survey of Multinationals”, The Economist, 27 March 1993, pp.2 and 9); “TNCs reportedly control 90% of
the world’s technology patents”: Howard A. Kwon, “Patent Protection and Technology Transfer in the Developing World: The Thailand Experience” (1995) 28 Geo. Wash.
J. Int’l L. & Econ. 567, 570, fn.13 (citing Suwanna Asavaroengchai, “Seeking a Fair Deal in Global Trade”, Bangkok Post, 19 October 1994, p.31); Tom Athanasiou,
Dividend Planet: The Ecology of Rich and Poor (Athens, GA/London: University of Georgia Press, 1996), p.194; David Korten,When Corporations Rule the World (San
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1995), p.124; and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),World Investment Report (2001), p.9.
9David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal
of International Law 931, 933.
10Gotzmann, “Legal Personality of the Corporation and International Criminal Law” (2008) 1(1) Q.L.S.R. 38, 40.
11Claudio Grossman and Daniel D. Bradlow, “Are we Being Propelled Towards a People-centered Transnational Legal Order?” (1993) 3 Am. U.J. Int’l & Pol’y 1, 8 (“[t]he
fact that they have multiple production facilities means that [transnational corporations] can evade state power and the constraints of national regulatory schemes by moving
their operations between their different facilities around the world”); Nicola Jägers, “The Legal Status of theMultinational Corporation Under International Law” inMichael
K. Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.260; and
Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights” (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443, 461.
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very limited sanctions for torts and human rights
violations.12 Secondly, a lack of sufficient protection
against MNCs at domestic level, especially in less
developed states, is largely due to the overwhelming
importance attached to economic growth and the idea of
a globalised free market.13 Against this background,
domestic measures are no longer sufficient to deal with
corporate abuses on a transnational scale.14
Corporate law is a fast developing field and an
increasingly important component of legal systems around
the world; however, corporate social responsibility is a
similarly important discipline owing to the human rights
implications of commercial conduct. In the last decades,
the United Nations has attempted to consider whether
international human rights law is intertwined with the
imposition of criminal liability, insofar as multinational
corporations engage in activities that may result in harm
or human rights abuses.
Despite these challenges, there has been a notable
movement towards international corporate social
responsibility—driven forward by NGOs and similar
bodies—buttressed by the belief that some commercial
abuses should be enforced at international level.15 This
has resulted in a proliferation of voluntary codes of
conduct to ensure compliance with internationally
accepted minimum standards of treatment and has
consequently led to a more ethical approach by MNCs.16
It is important to note, however, that these codes do not
entail any enforcement mechanism and thus remain
entirely voluntary (soft law), thereby providing very
limited protection against transnational corporate abuses.
This raises the question: in the absence of reliable
international and domestic regulation, are MNCs free to
pursue short-term profit maximisation goals, irrespective
of the impact on local communities and the welfare of
the host state?
In order to facilitate this discussion, the article begins
by exploring the challenges posed by a lack of
international corporate personality and MNCs
accountability at international level.17 Secondly,
significant legal developments at international level are
assessed to determine the extent to which they have been
successful in holding MNCs accountable. The Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights introduced by
Ruggie in 201118 form part of this discussion. Thirdly, a
proposal to codify Principle No.2,
“an independent corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, which means that business enterprises
should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on
the rights of others and address adverse impacts with
which they are involved,”
is advanced.19 Last but not least, a conclusion that ties
together the various strands of argument through this
article is provided.
Multinational corporations and
international human rights law
In the latter half of the 20th century, the forces of
globalisation allowed companies to pursue international
trade, and in the process reigniting the age-old challenge
of regulating international corporate activities.20 Some of
the most notable cases of human rights violations
involving MNCs during that period include BP in
Columbia,21 Shell in Ogoniland22 and Unocal in Burma
(Myanmar).23 However, human rights abuses involving
corporate actors are not new, having been documented
during the apartheid era in South Africa,24 the Second
World War where slave labour was prevalent in Nazi
Germany,25 to the mistreatment of workforce on colonised
plantations during and in the aftermath of the abolition
of slavery.26 In this century, the traditional theory
12Milton Friedman, cited in Michael K. Addo, “Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: An Introduction” in Addo, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility
of Transnational Corporations (1999), pp.3–38, p.11; Eric Engle, “Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for Human Rights Violations?” (2006) 20 St.
John’s Legal Comment 287, 300; Grossmann and Bradlow, “AreWe Being Propelled Towards a People-centered Transnational Legal Order?” (1993) 9 American University
Journal of International Law & Policy 1, 8; Cynthia A. Williams, “Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalisation” (2002) 35 UC Davis Law Review
705, 769.
13Harvard Law Review Association (HLRA), “Developments in the Law: V. Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law” (2001) 114 Harvard
Law Review 2025, 2031; and Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights” (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443, 457.
14Barnali Choudhury, “Beyond the Alien Tort ClaimsAct: Alternative Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses” (2005) 26North-Western
Journal of International Law& Business 43, 74–75; Jägers, “The Legal Status of theMultinational Corporation Under International Law” in Addo,Human Rights Standards
and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999), p.261; and Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights” (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443, 461–473.
15Kinley and Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 934.
16Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights” (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443, 448.
17Vincent Chetail, “The Legal Personality of Multinational Corporations, State Responsibility and Due Diligence: The Way Forward” (6 December 2013) in D. Alland, V.
Chetail, O. de Frouville and J.E. Vinuales (eds),Unity and Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Prof. Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Boston/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2014), p.106, SSRN. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364450 [Accessed 3 May 2016].
18Ruggie, Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (2013), p.xi.
19Ruggie, Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (2013), p.xxi.
20 Peter T. Muchlinski, “Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?” (2001) 77 International Affairs 1, 31.
21 “BP accused of funding Colombian death Squads”, Observer, 20 October 1996, pp.1 and 18.
22Human Rights Watch, Nigeria, The Ogoni Crisis: A Case Study of Military Repression in South East Nigeria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); Ben Naanen,
“Oil Producing Minorities and the Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism: The Case of the Ogoni Uprising People” (1995) 33 Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics 45; Eghosa Osaghae, “The Ogoni Uprising: Oil, Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State” (1991) 94 African Affairs 325; S. Skogly,
“Complexities in Human Rights Protection: Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni Conflict in Nigeria” (1997) 15 N.Q.H.R. 52; and Heike Fabig, “The Body Shop and
the Ogoni” in Addo, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999), pp.309–321.
23Doe v Unocal , US Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal., 31 August 2000, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13327; William Branigin, “Claim Against Unocal Rejected: Judge Cites Evidence of
Abuses in Burma but No Jurisdiction”,Washington Post, 8 September 2000, p.E10.
24 John Daniel, Vanusha Naidoo and Sanusha Naidu, “The South Africans Have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa” in John Daniel, Adam Habib
and Roger Southall (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004 (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 2003), p.368.
25 John C. Beyer and Stephen A. Schneider, “Forced Labor under the Third Reich”, Study Paper (Nathan Associates Inc, 1999).
26See the example of Siemens; B.M. Magubane, “Reflections on the Challenges Confronting Post-Apartheid South Africa”, Discussion Paper Series No.7 (1994). Available
at: http://www.unesco.org/most/magu.htm [Accessed 3 May 2016].
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signifying that states are the primary bearers of human
rights obligations has been challenged by the academic
community.27 Likewise, with NGOs making greater use
of technology and thereby bringing to light human rights
violations involving MNCs, the international legal order
has been rendered increasingly untenable. However,
despite its appeal, extending human rights obligations to
private entities such as MNCs, or, as Andrew Clapham
suggests, “the private sphere”, would require a radical
change in the social, political and legal structures that
underpin our established conception of human rights.28
Thus, a discussion ofMNCs and human rights obligations
has never been more significant.
The concept of human rights first appeared in English
law in the form of a “right to private property”, owing to
the historic imbalance extant in the property rights of
individuals with that of the dominant monarchic state in
which they subsisted.29 By the turn of the 19th century,
the notion of human rights had developed further and
began to distinguish groups of individuals.30 As one
academic commentator observed, “while by no means
the prerogative of ‘modernity’, the large number of human
beings were excluded by this peculiar ontological
construction”.31 The notion of human rights did not extend
to slaves, indigenous people or the mentally disabled.32
On the other hand, it resulted in the furtherance of
protection for private accretions of wealth. For example,
Protocol 1 art.1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) clearly states that “every natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions”.33
Despite some contentions that international treaties
may be construed so as to apply directly to private entities
such as MNCs,34 there is a consensus among legal
commentators that such treaties can only bind states and
state actors.35 Additionally, while the US has made some
efforts to impose human rights obligations on MNCs
through their national laws,36 and similar attempts have
been made by the UN Sub-Commission in the form of
the “Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights”,37 MNCs have simply not received
sufficient recognition by the international community to
be held accountable for human rights obligations. But, in
light of the changing economic landscape, and the fact
that MNCs are now a part of the international legal order,
albeit in the absence of international legal personality,
the legal order must be reformed so as to accommodate
these powerful entities and prevent abuse of their
dominant position.
Non-state actors as duty bearers
One of the fundamental elements of international law is
that it regulates conduct among states; subsequently, when
international law first began to evolve, states were the
only subjects of international law. Governments were the
main bearers of responsibility for most human rights
violations, and thus the biggest share of responsibility for
compliance with human rights norms and principles was
vested in the state. Corporations traditionally possessed
less ethical obligations since their actions are—in
principle—driven by profit,38 i.e. maximising
shareholders’ investments and returning profit to the
shareholder. The question then becomes: if states are the
only subjects of international law, do non-state actors
possess human rights obligations under international law?
Philip Alston describes this anomaly as the “not-a-cat”
syndrome that appears in the conduct of non-state actors,
including multinational corporations to avoid
accountability or criminally liability for their
misconduct.39
Sensu stricto, international human rights law is
primarily concerned with individual human beings, even
though it has evolved to recognise that persons that may
not be regarded as “state actors” still hold human rights
obligations whether those violating international law do
so by acting under the patronage of the state or only as
private individuals.40 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 1966 further supports the view that
not only states but also groups and legal persons may be
held accountable for human rights violations.41
International law poses strict human rights obligations
on states to respect and protect the rights of individuals
within their territory and jurisdiction, including actions
from third parties resulting in human rights violations.
27Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
28Andrew Clapham,Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Michael Addo, “The corporation as victim of human rights violations” inHuman
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999), pp.187–197; M.T. Kamminga, “Holding multinational corporations accountable” in P.
Alston et al. (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.553–569, p.569; Young James and Webster v UK (1981) ECtHR Series A,
Vol.139; and Costello-Roberts v UK, (1993) ECtHR Series A, Vol.247.
29C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
30Muchlinski, “Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?” 77 (2001) 77 International Affairs 1, 33.
31Upendra Baxi, “Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights” (1998) 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 126, 135.
32Baxi, “Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights” (1998) 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 126, 135.
33Human Rights Review (2012), available at: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/human-rights-review-2012 [Accessed 3 May 2016].
34 J.J. Paust, “The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process” (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 1229, 1242.
35 J. Delbrück, “Third-Party Effects of Fundamental Rights through Obligations under International Law?” (1975) 12 Law and State 61, 64.
36 S. Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p.21; US Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain 124 S. Ct
2739 (2004).
37 Sub-Commission Resolution 200316 (13 August 2003), para.2, reprinted in Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on its
Fifty-Fifth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/43 (20 October 2003), p.51.
38Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law 45.
39 Philip Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.3.
40Kadic v Karadzic 74 F. 3d 377 (2nd Cir. N.Y., 6 January 1996) (No. 94-9035, 1544, 94-9069, 1541).
41See art.5(1) ICCPR 1966 declaring that: “Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity
or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present
Covenant.”
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Human rights violations may be attributed to the state
through the actions of third parties, or in situations where
they fail to take appropriate steps (legislation or other
domestic policies) to prevent, investigate, punish and
redress the actions of third parties.
Multinational corporations, therefore, can be duty
bearers and responsible for human rights violations and
internationally wrongful acts even without the presence
of a link suggesting state action or complicity. Corporate
legal personality and legal responsibility was recognised
by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona
Traction case, where the court held that “[o]nly the
company, which was endowed with legal personality,
could take action in respect of matters that were of a
corporate character”.42 This was further reiterated by the
Court of Justice in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, where it was
held that “in determining whether a company possesses
independent and distinct legal personality, international
law looks to the rules of the relevant domestic law”.43
Legal developments in international law
The genesis of international law can be traced back to the
18th century, at a period when diplomatic protection and
treaties of capitulation were commonly used mechanisms
for protecting foreign nationals and their property.44 Thus,
protection of foreign property and development of
international commercial markets, spearheaded by
multinational companies such as the East India Company
(EIC), were central to the development of international
law. During the 18th century, the EIC was commissioned
on the Indian sub-continent to trade in silks and spices.45
The collection of taxes for the provinces of Bengal, Bihar
and Orissa in India were thereafter subcontracted to the
EIC, which utilised a private army to enforce tax duties.46
In its role as a tax collecting agency on behalf of the
realm, fortified by expansive political and legal influence,
the EIC could no longer be considered an orthodox
company. This transformed the EIC into a destructive,
avaricious and profit-driven colonial entity.47 By 1803,
the dangerously unregulated MNC, wielding a
260,000-strong army, had taken control of an entire
subcontinent through aggressive imperialistic policies.
The EIC’s acts of armed conquests, subjugation and the
looting of vast territories across southern Asia were later
to be considered the most morally indefensible and
blatantly violent acts in corporate history.48 Thus, even
before the advent of globalisation, EIC provided a strong
example of the scale of corporate abuse possible when
MNC activities remain unregulated.
Despite the dangers posed by MNCs such as the EIC,
it was their desire to secure foreign interests that
ultimately led to the introduction of principles of state
responsibility into customary international law.49 In 1758,
Emmerich Vattel advanced that “whoever uses a citizen
ill, indirectly offends the State, which is bound to protect
this citizen”.50 He was of the view that states were within
their rights to set pre-conditions on the admission foreign
nationals, and once in the host state they should be subject
to the same laws as home nationals.51 However, he also
believed that foreign nationals should remain members
of their home state and for that reason should not be
“obliged to submit, like subjects, to all the commands of
the sovereign”.52 Thus, a foreign national retains
membership of his home state, including the right to
private property which was considered central to the
wealth of nations.53 Thus, Vattel disagreed with the “droit
d’aubaine” and the “right of escheat”—decrees which
were understood to mean that on the death of a foreign
national, his property would automatically revert to his
host state.54 As a result, the maltreatment of a foreign
national or his property by the host state was to be
considered an injury done to his home state. This
assessment ultimately formed the basis of the diplomatic
protection principle enshrined in international law. The
principle is premised on the idea that a harm done to a
state’s national is treated as a harm done to the state itself,
thus entitling the injured national state to claim damages.55
Although diplomatic protection would in the mid-20th
century be replaced by investment treaty arbitration,
42Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain), judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ.
43Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) , Preliminary Objections, 24 May 2007 [2007] ICJ Reports 194.
44Yoram Dinstein, “Diplomatic Protection of Companies Under International Law” in Karen Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of
Eric Suy (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), p.506.
45 See Nick Robins, “The world’s first multinational” (13 December 2004), New Statesman. Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2014/04/worlds
-first-multinational [Accessed 6 September 2015].
46William Dalrymple, “The East India Company: the original corporate raiders” (4 March 2015), Guardian. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04
/east-india-company-original-corporate-raiders [Accessed 3 may 2016].
47Dalrymple, “The East India Company” (4 March 2015), Guardian.
48Dalrymple, “The East India Company” (4 March 2015), Guardian.
49K.J. Vandevelde, “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” (2005) 12(1) U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 157; and K. Miles, The
Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment, and the Safeguarding of Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Pt 1.
50E. Vattel and J. Chitty, The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia: T. & J.W.
Johnson, 1844), p.161.
51Vattel and Chitty, The Law of Nations (1844), pp.100 and 104.
52Vattel and Chitty, The Law of Nations (1844), p.108.
53Vattel and Chitty, The Law of Nations (1844), p.109.
54A.H. Roth, The International Minimum Standard (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1949), pp.26–27; E.M. Borchard,Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or The Law of International
Claims (New York: Banks Law Publishing Co, 1915), pp.35–36.
55Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, “As If: The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection” (2007) 18(1) European Journal of International Law 37, 37.
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stronger national laws and a slew of internationals of
codes of conduct, it marked the first international attempt
to invoke international law in matters involving MNCs.56
However, diplomatic protection was not a mechanism
for controlling the activities ofMNCs, but rather a means
of enforcing claims on behalf of injured foreign nationals.
Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, aggressive
strategies to secure diplomatic protection for claims were
more often employed by potent states.57 For instance, in
the period between 1820 and 1914, Britain alone
interfered in Latin-America in excess of 40 times to either
safeguard their property or reinstate order,58 even where
claims were fallacious in nature and the punishment
unjust.59 This culminated in the Western/Eastern divide,
in which opposition by developing nations mainly in
Latin-America against Western-led international law
standards grew, while, although insisting on such
standards, the West depended on treaties of capitulation
and diplomatic protection to impose extraterritorial
jurisdiction and secure their foreign economic interests.60
Although an increase in global trade and investment in
the 20th century, especially between Western states, led
to a decline in the officious practices foreshadowing the
rise of an investor-friendly model, the historic opposition
to Western imperialistic international standards, coupled
with corporate personality, would defeat any attempt at
formulating international legal standards for MNCs.
The development of international human rights
emerged more strongly than ever shortly after the Second
WorldWar, but also highlighted the first major challenge
at formulating an international legal structure for
corporations.61 Its development epitomised the pinnacle
of mankind’s efforts to structure and formalise social
advancement on a global scale. It is perhaps indicative
of the importance of human rights that their regulation
and enforcement could not be delegated to individual
national states; rather, this was considered a combined
international duty.62 The fundamental basis of these rights
is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
adopted by resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1948.63 The UDHR is directed towards
protecting human dignity through its various articles on
fundamental freedoms and rights. It states that “every
organ of society”—a term which possibly includes
juridical persons—“shall strive by teaching and education
to promote respect for these rights and freedoms”.64 Thus,
despite being primarily directed towards states, it does
nevertheless address non-state actors too. However, this
statement is only contained within the Preamble and has
not achieved customary international law status.
Nevertheless, the UDHR is merely a declaration and for
that reason it is non-binding, imposing only ethical duties
on MNCs at best.65 Thus, a feeble attempt at imposing
international responsibilities on companies left an
important question unanswered; do human rights
obligations extend to MNCs despite their legal
personality? Subsequent attempts at formulating
international responsibilities for companies have shown
that legal personality enables companies to enjoy
non-state actor rights but with no responsibilities, despite
operating on an international platform.66
Furthermore, the ghosts of diplomatic protection and
treaties of capitulation have been a derailing factor
towards adoptingWestern-led international law standards.
For instance, during the 1974 Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO Declaration) and the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States,67 newly independent states especially
from Latin-America showed a general reluctance towards
international law standards. The NIEO Declaration
provides that neo-colonial practices such as covert
investment strategies and the use of corporations to
influence decision making in weaker nations are a
hindrance not only to the advancement of international
law, but also to the protection of emerging states’
interests. TheNIEODeclaration also restated the principle
of permanent sovereignty, and in so doing included the
states’ right to regulate MNCs. The Charter, however,
simply elaborated on the principles already contained
within the NIEO Declaration and included some
supplementary measures to protect foreign investments.68
These supplementary measures recognised a state’s right
to regulate all investments within its territory but stressed
that a state cannot be obliged to accord more favourable
treatment to the investments of a foreign national.69
However, despite the Charter confirming a state’s right
56H.J. Steiner and D.F. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems: Materials and Text, 2nd edn (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1976) 357; Miles, The Origins of International
Investment Law (2013), Pt 1; S.N. Guha Roy, “Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?” (1961) 55 American
Journal of International Law 863.
57M. Hood, Gunboat Diplomacy 1895–1905 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975); J. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval
Force, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1981).
58C. Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.54.
59D.R. Shea, The Calvo Clause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p.12.
60M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.19–20;
61Mashood A. Baderin and Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Development of International Human Rights Law Before and After the UDHR (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2013),
Ch.1: “International Human Rights Law”, p.1.
62 Paul Redmond, “Business and human rights: the emerging international regime for corporate responsibility and accountability”, OECD Watch Diplomacy Training
Program 1, Ch.6.
63Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948), p.71.
64 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#ap [Accessed 3 May 2016].
65Kinley and Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 949.
66Peter Muchlinski, “Multinational Enterprises as Actors in International Law” in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International
Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010).
67Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res. 3201 (1 May 1974) (1974) 13 I.L.M. 715; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, GA Res. 3281 (12 December 1974) (1975) 14 I.L.M. 251; and M. Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979).
68Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (12 December 1974) (1975) 14 I.L.M. 251, s.2.2.
69Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 (1975) 14 I.L.M. 251, 264. Subparagraph (a) was approved by 113 states and opposed by 10. Four states abstained
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to regulate MNCs, it expanded on this provision by
encouraging co-operation between states when
determining the regulation of MNCs.70 Both the NIEO
Declaration and Charter were ultimately advanced by the
combined force of the developing nations who wished to
aver their national sovereignty to the world. However,
the Declaration and Charter had no binding authority and
as a consequence could not replace extant laws.
However, not all provisions of the Declaration and
Charter were abandoned. Indeed, the passages relating to
the strict regulation of MNCs reappeared in 1974 when
a Commission on Transnational Corporations was
assembled by the UN Economic and Social Council in
order to establish a draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations.71 This once again resulted in
a divide between capital importing and capital exporting
countries owing to their concerns about the extent of its
application. The question that both these countries wanted
urgent answers to was whether the Code applied only to
the conduct ofMNCs or whether its application extended
to the host state’s treatment of foreign nationals. In 1980,
the UN Economic and Social Council replied and stated
that the Code would be applicable in both cases.72
However, after a decade of negotiations, the Code was
finally dropped.73
The frustration of the NIEO Declaration, the Charter
and shortly thereafter the Code did not prevent
international law from pursuing other avenues to achieve
an adequate international framework for the regulation
of MNCs. Further legal attempts to regulate corporate
behaviour at international level came in the period
between 1960 to the late 1970s. These developments are
explored below in chronological order. However, many
of these attempts were met with fierce resistance from
MNCs and national governments. The failure to reach a
consensus onmandatory regulation ofMNCs culminated
in a self-regulatory approach.74
OECD Guidelines
The OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises 1976 represents the first major
attempt at formulating international standards forMNCs.75
It covered an array of principles on the national treatment
of MNCs as well as general OECD Guidelines on
Multinational Enterprises recommended by OECD
Member States to ensure compliance with the policies of
host states.76 The purpose of the Guidelines was to
promote foreign direct investment and, in doing so,
encourage “the positive contribution which multinational
enterprises can make towards economic and social
progress”.77 The Guidelines covered specific areas such
as employment and industrial relations, the environment,
combatting bribery, consumer interests, science and
technology, competition and taxation.78 Furthermore, the
Guidelines also recognised the legitimate right of a state
to govern the activities of MNCs in parallel to standards
of international law.79A revised version of the Guidelines
was adopted in 2000, which recommended MNCs to
“respect the human rights of those affected by their
activities” for the very first time.80 The latest revision in
2011 expanded on this recommendation by introducing
an entire chapter on human rights.81 It requires MNCs to
respect human rights, avoid causing or contributing to
adverse human rights impacts, address and seek ways to
prevent or mitigate these impacts, have a policy
commitment to respect human rights, carry out human
rights due diligence, and provide for remediation of
adverse human rights impacts.82
However, it is important to note that the Guidelines do
not represent hard law and are only “soft law” initiatives
designed to promote and encourage responsible business
conduct. Companies that choose not to adhere to these
Guidelines can simply put forward their reasons for not
doing so, and the only ramifications they will suffer is
reputational damage to their international image. Thus,
“non-adherence will not render anMNC in strict technical
breach of the Guidelines”.83 As a result, the Guidelines
are more often than not met with cynicism by many
companies. There is, however, an implementation
mechanism for the Guidelines.84 To give effect to the
Guidelines, it requires Member States to set up national
contact points (NCPs) to promote the Guidelines and
“contribute to the resolution of issues that arise relating
to the implementation of the Guidelines in specific
instances”.85The “specific instances” scenario arises when
a third party alleges that there has been a breach of the
Guidelines by a business. In these instances, the “NCP
70Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 (1975) 14 I.L.M. 251 at 264 subpara.(b).
71 Peter Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.660; and W. Spröte, “Negotiations on a United Nations
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations” (1990) 33 G.Y.I.L. 331.
72 Peter Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p.593.
73The draft Code is available in (1984) 23 I.L.M. 626; and Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law (1995), p.661.
74Catherine Pedamon, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A New Approach to Promoting Integrity and Responsibility” (2010) 31 Company Lawyer 172, 173.
75 “The OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises”, DAFFE/IME(2011)20 (reviewed 2011). Available at: http://www
.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/oecddeclarationanddecisions.htm [Accessed 3 May 2016].
76Engobo Emesh, Rhuks Ako, Patrick Okonmah and Lawrence Ogechukwu Obokoh, “Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What lessons from the Global Financial
Crisis?” (2010) 11(2) German Law Journal 239.
77OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, para.2. The original Guidelines are reproduced at (1976) 15 I.L.M. 967.
78OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2008). Available at; http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
79OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2008), para.9 states: “Governments adhering to the Guidelines set them forth with the understanding that they will fulfil
their responsibilities to treat enterprises equitably and in accordance with international law and with their contractual obligations.”
80“The OECDDeclaration and Decisions on International Investment andMultinational Enterprises”, DAFFE/IME (2000), p.20. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate
/mne/1922428.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
81OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2011). Available at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
82OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2011).
83 S. Tully, “The 2000 Review of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises” (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 394, 403.
84 See OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2008), Pt II: “Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, pp.27–33.
85 See OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2008), Pt II, pp.27–33.
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will offer a forum for discussion” and also seek advice
from the Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises (CIME) on “the interpretation
of the Guidelines in particular circumstances” and
“facilitate access to consensual and non-adversarial
means, such as conciliation or mediation, to assist the
parties in dealing with the issues”.86 However, the NCP
and the CIME do not have any enforcement powers and
only perform consultative, advisory and clarificatory
roles.87 Thus, the Guidelines can be written off as nothing
more than mere moral requests.
ILO Tripartite Declaration
Not long after the OECD Guidelines were introduced,
the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the Tripartite
Declaration) was released.88 The Tripartite Declaration
has been amended twice in 200089 and 200690 and provides
guidelines for governments, multinational enterprises,
employers and workers’ organisations which they are
“recommended to observe on a voluntary basis”.91
Reacting to concerns about labour standards and social
issues, the Tripartite Declaration contains guidelines on
employment, training, conditions of work and life, and
industrial relations.92 There is also specific reference to
human rights, which provides that all parties “should
respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.93
Moreover, the 2000 version brought with it some positive
improvements in the area of human rights protection
whereby a new passagewas incorporatedwhich provides
that
“[m]ultinational enterprises, as well as national
enterprises, should respect the minimum age for
admission to employment or work in order to secure
the effective abolition of child labour”.94
Thus, despite the lack of general human rights protection,
the coverage for workers’ rights is extensive. Moreover,
the tripartite nature of the Tripartite Declaration is a
positive step forward as it indicates the backing of
governments, employers and workers. Nevertheless,
despite the reference to the UDHR and the positive
improvements to eliminate child labour and so forth, the
Tripartite Declaration remains entirely voluntary, with
only aspirational principles.95 Furthermore, there are no
express provisions concerning monitoring arrangements
or implementation devices to ensure MNCs’ compliance
with the Tripartite Declaration. However, when
governments, multinational enterprises and employers’
and workers’ organisations give effect to the Tripartite
Declaration, this is monitored by way of a periodic
survey.96 All four parties are thus obliged to take part in
a survey whereby they are required to provide responses
to questions about their experience concerning the
implementation of the Tripartite Declaration. Once these
responses have been examined, recommendations may
be adopted by the ILOGoverning Body.97Although some
guidance exists on the conduct ofMNCs, in reality,MNCs
cannot be compelled to comply with the Tripartite
Declaration as it lacks the necessary legal mandate.98
UN Global Compact
TheUNGlobal Compact was launched in July 2000 after
it was introduced by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, in January 1999 in Davos.99 Today the Global
Compact has over 10,000 participants from 130 countries,
making it the largest non-binding corporate responsibility
initiative worldwide. The Global Compact is a “soft law”
policy initiative for businesses which voluntarily commit
to respect and support 10 principles in the areas of human
rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption,100
derived from the UDHR, the ILO’s Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development and the
UN Convention against Corruption.101 Principles 1 and 2
concern human rights and state that:
“Businesses should support and respect the
protection of internationally proclaimed human
rights; and make sure that they are not complicit in
human rights abuses.”102
86 See OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2008), Pt II, pp.27–33.
87 Surya Deva, “Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where from Here?” (2003) 19 Connecticut Journal of International Law
1, 5.
88Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 204th Sess. (16 November 1977) (1978) 17 I.L.M. 422.
89Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess. (17 November 2000) (2002) 41 I.L.M. 186. Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
90Tripartite Declaration of Principles ConcerningMultinational Enterprises and Social Policy, available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
91Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (17 November 2000), para.7 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 186. Available at: http://www
.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
92Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187.
93Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, para.8 [2002] 41 I.L.M. 186
94Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, para.36 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 186.
95 J. Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms: A Comparative Analysis of the UN Norms for Business With Existing International Instruments” (Amsterdam: April
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The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International, 2005), p.219.
96 ILO, “Tripartite Declaration. Follow-up Survey”. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/empent/Informationresources/WCMS_101251/lang--en/index.htm [Accessed 3 May
2015].
97 ILO, “Tripartite Declaration. Follow-up Survey”.
98 Philip Rudolph thought that the Tripartite Declaration relied on external pressure generated by the public to influence wrongdoers to ultimately change their behaviour.
Rudolph, “Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises” in Corporate Social Responsibility (2005), p.219.
99 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (31 January 1999), UN Doc. SG/SM/6448 (199).
100The introduction of the 10th principle on corruption was announced at the Global Compact Leaders’ Summit, held in New York in June 2004.
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Principles 3–6 expressly deal with labour rights, whereas
Principles 7–9 deal with the promotion of environmental
rights, and Principle 10 speaks out on the fight against
corruption.103
While the principles dealing with labour rights are very
specific, the same cannot be said for Principles 1 and 2
which are very broad indeed. The general promotional
nature of the first two principles might therefore appeal
to companies wishing to use it as a public relations
instrument; however, the vagueness of these principles
will be to the detriment of the effective implementation
of the Global Compact.104 As previously mentioned, the
Global Compact is an entirely voluntary process seeking
to reward good practice by publicising information for
others to learn from.105 Thus, companies acceding to the
Global Compact must submit an annual report on the
implementation of the 10 principles by providing one
concrete example on how they have progressed towards
these principles.106 However, there are no review
mechanisms and as such very few members have been
noted to properly comply with the reporting
requirements.107 Thus, the Global Compact falls within
the same voluntary categories as all the other international
initiatives designed to regulate corporate behaviour.
The realisation of the Global Compact initiative was
examined in 2010 by the UN Joint Inspection unit. Even
though the successes of the initiative were praised,
particularly with regard to the engagement of the United
Nations with the private sector, some of the main
criticisms focussed on the lack of a proper regulatory
governmental and institutional framework, as well as the
lack of a clear and articulated mandate which resulted in
a rather blurred focus and impact.108
However, owing to the criticisms the Global Compact
received, in June 2004, a new “sanctioning” mechanism
was introduced.109 Consequently, if a member fails to
submit its “communication on progress” within one year,
they will be considered for all intents and purposes as
“non-communicating” until such a report is submitted.110
However, where a member fails to submit its
“communication on progress” within a two-year period,
they will be “de-listed” and the company’s name may be
published.111 A further advancement to the Global
Compact was the introduction of a complaints
procedure.112Accordingly, if a complaint signifying either
the systematic or egregious abuse of the Global
Compact’s principles is received, this will be passed on
to the relevant company with a request for both a written
explanation and any measures taken to resolve the
matter.113 Thus, where a member fails to respond to a
request for written information concerning a complaint
within a certain period, they may be considered
“non-communicating” and labelled as such on the
website.114 While these measures could be construed as a
step in the right direction towards holding MNCs to
account, some academic commentators remain sceptical
on whether real change can occur, owing to “past
experience and the vague procedures”.115
The initiative reflected the UN Secretary-General’s
vision of giving a human face to the global market, a
rather ambitious idea that has historically stumbled across
a number of obstacles. Since then, various human rights
bodies have examined the effectiveness of the UN’s
strategies and policies in relation to multinational
corporations with a view to making proposals for
strengthening the embodiment of human rights principles
in the practice of multinational corporations.
Voluntary codes
The increasing demands forMNCs to behave in a socially
responsible manner—emanating from non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), trade unions, developed countries’
consumers, and community groups—have stemmed from
the inadequacy of the current international human rights
framework to adequately deal with the threats posed by
MNCs.116 Indeed, MNCs have argued that human rights
are not the concerns of corporations but rather that of
states and international bodies.117 Furthermore,
corporations have also maintained that their ultimate duty
is owed to their shareholders for the purpose of wealth
maximisation.118 However, while this view is ubiquitous,
the increasing exposure of human rights abuses committed
by MNCs across the globe has prompted MNCs to adopt
voluntary codes of conduct to show their commitment to
the protection of human rights and advancement of social
103 For more information, see “The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact”, available at: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles [Accessed 3
May 2016].
104Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms” (April 2005), p.11.
105The Global Compact website states that “the global compact is a purely voluntary initiative, and does not police or enforce the behaviour or actions of companies. Rather,
it is designed to stimulate change and to promote good corporate citizenship and encourage innovative solutions and partnerships”.
106Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms” (April 2005), p.11.
107Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms” (April 2005), p.12.
108UN Joint Inspection Unit, “United Nations corporate partnerships: The role and functioning of the Global Compact”, Doc. No.JIU/REP/2010/9 (Geneva: 2010).
109 “United Nations Global Compact Basic Guide Communication on Progress”, available at: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_progress/Tools
_and_Publications/COP_Basic_Guide.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
110“United Nations Global Compact Note on IntegrityMeasures”, available at: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/Integrity_measures/Integrity_Measures
_Note_EN.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
111 “United Nations Global Compact Note on Integrity Measures”.
112Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms” (April 2005), p.12.
113 “United Nations Global Compact Note on Integrity Measures”.
114 “United Nations Global Compact Note on Integrity Measures”.
115Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms” (April 2005), p.13.
116Kinley and Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 953.
117Kinley and Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 953.
118Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, N.Y. Times, 13 September 1970 (Magazine), p.32.
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standards. This commitment stems, not from any
philanthropic motivation, but rather from an increased
awareness of stakeholder expectations as well as the harm
that may result from a tarnished brand image.119 MNCs
therefore see it in their commercial interest to accede to
voluntary codes of conduct, and more often than not,
publicise these in the guise of socially responsible
practices.120
A profusion of voluntary codes of conduct emerged in
the late 20th century with the liberalisation of trade and
investment.121 The purpose of these codes of conduct was
to demonstrate a commitment, beyond the letter of the
law, to human rights and social standards across the
globe.122 Today it is difficult to find a MNC that does not
claim to support a voluntary code of conduct indicating
adherence to principles of human rights. The earliest
codes of conduct can be traced back to the Sullivan
Principles, a US-based initiative targeting MNCs
operating in apartheid South Africa, and the MacBride
Principles, encouraging affirmative action employment
programmes in Northern Ireland.123 More recent codes of
conduct include the Worldwide Responsible Apparel
Production (WRAP),124USApparel Industry Partnership’s
Workplace Code of Conduct125 and the Social
Accountability International (SA8000).126 The SA8000
and WRAP initiatives are overseen by bodies that carry
out social audits to monitor compliance. Similar codes
of conduct have been adopted by large MNCs operating
in less developed countries across the globe, such as Nike,
BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Rio Tinto, to name a few.
While the contents of each code vary considerably,
environmental and labour issues remain the focus.127 Some
of these codes of conduct also explicitly address
international human rights. For instance, Rio Tinto’s code
of conduct supports the UDHR and provides that:
“We support human rights consistent with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Rio
Tinto respects those rights in conducting the Group’s
operations throughout the world.”128
However, given that the overwhelming majority of
companies are motivated primarily by profit, and with
the realisation that reputational damage could adversely
impact their bottom-line profits, they take action to avoid
such consequences,129 as exemplified by Shell in 1995
after the death of the anti-oil activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.130
Shell Group were harshly criticised for their failure to
intervene; however, Shell maintained their position that
domestic politics were a matter for the host state and not
for corporations.131 Furthermore, Shell’s Statement of
General Business Principles supported this position.132
However, public scrutiny proved overwhelming and not
long after the incident Shell issued a revised statement in
which it acknowledged the change in public opinion.133
Similarly, Nike and Gap also faced severe criticisms
after high profile campaigns brought to light their use of
supply chain subcontractors, who employed child
labourers to work in sweatshop conditions.134 Moreover,
international trade union organisations used videos to
show children stitching footballs with FIFA labels in
Sialkot, Pakistan just before the World Cup in 1998.135
119Sol Picciotto, “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business” (2003) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 139; and Kinley and Tadaki, “From
Talk to Walk” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 953.
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These corporations have therefore realised the impact
that negative publicity can have on their high profile brand
names, especially campaigns exposing the “labor behind
the label”,136 and thus the adoption of voluntary codes of
conduct is undertaken to demonstrate commitment to the
protection of human rights. However, the proliferation
of voluntary codes of conduct has resulted in a widespread
debate over their practical use and whether they are
sufficient tools for dealing with human rights abuses
committed by MNCs. On the one hand, corporate codes
can be made legally enforceable in a number of ways. On
the other hand, corporate codes attract criticism owing to
their selective content, lack of monitoring appliances and
implementation mechanisms.
HalinaWard notes that voluntary codes of conduct can
be made legally enforceable in three distinct ways. First,
corporate codes “can shape the standards of care that are
legally expected of businesses”.137 This can be achieved
through the incorporation of codes directly into supplier,
agency and employment contracts. For instance, a US
court approved the inclusion of a warranty against
“conflict diamonds” in a settlement agreement, as it was
explicitly provided for in the South African diamond
mining industry code.138 Additionally, a contractual
agreement that is entered into between a company and
its employee by collective bargaining, and incorporates
some aspect of the code, will also in effect legalise the
code.139 Secondly, the standards that MNCs expressly
provide for in corporate codes may be adopted by
regulatory bodies as possible reporting requirements.
Regulatory bodies possess certain statutory powers and
therefore have the ability to bind a code indirectly in this
way. For example, French legislation requires large
companies to provide non-financial reports regarding
social, environmental and governance aspects.140 Thirdly,
companies that make claims about abiding by certain
standards can quite conceivably be held liable for
misrepresentation if their statements of fact are found to
be untrue.141 A cogent example is Kasky v Nike,142 where
the Supreme Court of California upheld Kasky’s action
against Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under
California’s Unfair Competition Law and False
Advertising Law.143 Nike had published a report which
commented favourably on working conditions in Nike’s
Indonesian, Chinese and Vietnamese factories. However,
Kasky challenged the validity of this report and argued
that it was false advertising and did not comply with
Nike’s corporate code of practice as maintained by Nike.
The Supreme Court of California concurred that Nike’s
public statement was indeed “commercial speech” and
therefore was not protected by the First Amendment and
consequently contravened unfair competition law.144Thus,
voluntary commitments do indeed have very tangible
legal consequences such as those mentioned above.
However, a number of concerns remain, on account of
their voluntary nature. These codes are not only very
selective in their content, but they lack the necessary
monitoring and implementation mechanisms.145 A study
conducted by ILO to ascertain the extent of labour-related
material in 215 separate enterprise codes revealed that
the vast majority contained self-selected standards.146
Moreover, the study also found that the mention of
national laws in relation to wages was very common.
However, international labour standards were rarely
mentioned, and only one-quarter of the codes contained
any suggestion of collective bargaining and freedom of
association.147On the other hand, the majority of corporate
codes are largely dependent on internal procedures to
monitor their effective implementation.148 Indeed, where
external bodies have been sought to review the effective
implementation of corporate codes, critics such as Dara
O’Rourke have questioned their impartiality.149
Furthermore, NGOs and trade unions have in the past
refused to join the US Fair Labour Association owing to
their concerns about the effective implementation of
corporate codes.150 While the ILO survey discussed the
136Klein, No Logo (2000), pp.369–377.
137Halina Ward, “Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship” (February 2003), pp.6–7. Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16000IIED.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2016].
138Ward, “Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship” (February 2003), p.6.
139Ward, “Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship” (February 2003), p.6; and Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). Note that the UN’s Human Rights Norms for Corporations expressly state that “[e]ach
transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and incorporate these Norms into their contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors,
sub-contractor, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporations or business enterprise in
order to ensure respect for and implementation of the Norms”.
140 France Diplomatie, available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/economic-diplomacy-foreign-trade/corporate-social-responsibility/france-s
-domestic-csr-policy/article/extra-financial-reporting-made [Accessed 3 May 2016].
141Willem J.M. van Genugten, “The Status of Transnational Corporations in International Public Law” in Asborjn Eide et al. (eds), Human Rights and the Oil Industry
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2000), p.71 at pp.72–73.
142Nike Inc v Kasky 123 S. Ct 2554, 2555 (2003).
143Kasky v Nike 45 P. 3d 243 (Cal. 2002): “Overturning the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court of California held that since Nike’s statements were representations
of fact about the company’s commercial operations, they were commercial speech, and thus not protected by the First Amendment”: Kasky 45 P. 3d at 247. On 26 June
2003, the US Supreme Court dismissed a writ of certiorari, relying in part on the fact that the California court had yet to decide on the substance of the case: Nike v Kasky
123 S. Ct 2554, 2555–2557 (2003).
144Kasky 123 S. Ct 2554, 255 (2003), restating the California Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kasky v Nike Inc 27 Cal. 4th 939, 946, 45 P. 3d 243, 247 (2002).
145 Picciotto, “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business” (2003) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 142.
146 International Labour Office, Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade, “Overview of Global Developments and Office
Activities Concerning Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and Other Private Sector Initiatives Addressing Labour Issues”, ILO Doc. GB.273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev.1) (1998),
para.50; see also International Labour Office, Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade, “Further Examination of Questions
Concerning Private Initiatives, Including Codes of Conduct”, ILO Doc. GB.274/WP/SDL/1 (1999).
147 International Labour Office, “Overview of Global Developments and Office Activities”, ILODoc. GB.273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev.1) (1998), paras 52–56; see also International
Labour Office, “Further Examination of Questions”, ILO Doc. GB.274/WP/SDL/1 (1999).
148Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Party of the Trade Committee, “Codes of Corporate Conduct: An Expanded Review of their
Contents”, OECD Doc. TD/TC/WP(99)56/FINAL (2000), para. 85.
149Dara O’Rourke, “Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate, Third-Party Labor Monitoring” in Jenkins, Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights (2002),
p.196.
150Rhys Jenkins, “The Political Economy of Codes of Conduct” in Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights (2002), p.24.
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possibility of ILO taking on a greater role in terms of
specifying the content of codes as well as verifying
them,151 they have instead resorted to a minimalistic
approach whereby providing advice and guidance only.152
Thus, while corporate codes have “soft” positive effects
by putting the spotlight on human rights issues and
evidencing certain recognition of responsibility by the
respective companies, and possibly preparing the ground
for binding regulation,153 they lack a suitable legal
framework to ensure the effective enforcement and
implementation of corporate codes.
On 20 November 2009, the International Labour
Organisation issued the Guidelines on Cooperation
between the United Nations and the Business Sector,
calling for-profit, commercial enterprises or businesses,
as well as businesses associations and coalitions to
formulate and implement partnerships with the United
Nations in order to achieve a common purpose or
undertake a specific task and to share risks,
responsibilities, resources and benefits.154
UN norms
Despite numerous efforts to formulate an international
framework to regulate MNCs, there remains a “gap in
understanding what the international community expects
when it comes to human rights”.155 The United Nations
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights formed a working group “to conduct
relevant background research concerning transnational
corporations and human rights” for the purpose of drafting
a code of conduct to regulate MNCs.156 The working
group, after conducting extensive research, submitted its
findings to the Sub-Commission in the form of “Draft
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprise with Regard
to Human Rights”.157 The Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the
Draft Norms) was yet another attempt to regulate MNCs
at an international level.158 The Draft Norms envisaged
imposing binding obligations on MNCs under
international law, synonymous to those obligations
already accepted by states. Thus, while the Draft Norms
acknowledged states as the primary duty bearers, they
required MNCs to “promote, secure the fulfilment of,
respect, ensure respect of and protect” a wide range of
human rights in both international and national law.159
The Draft Norms had three distinct features. First, they
assimilated principles expressed in international codes of
conduct for business enterprises adopted by WHO, ILO
and the OECD, as well as the Rio Declaration on the
Environment and Development (1992), UDHR (1948),
the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development
(2002) and the WHO Health for All Policy for the
Twenty-first Century (1998).160 Secondly, they identified
ideals of MNCs behaviour rather than an acceptable
minimum standard of behaviour. Thus, the Draft Norms
were analogous to the UDHR in its articulation of ideal
standards of human rights.161 Thirdly, the Draft Norms
were intended to be non-voluntary and therefore legally
binding on MNCs. The legally binding nature is
understood to be reflected in the implementation of the
Draft Norms, which entails both a periodic reporting
requirement andmonitoring and verification by the UN.162
However, despite the above-mentioned features, which
would have certainly helped close the current regulatory
gap in terms of regulatingMNCs at an international level,
critics argued that the Draft Norms merely imposed
human rights obligations on MNCs currently addressed
to states.163 There were also concerns that the Draft Norms
might dilute state responsibility and thus weaken it.164 As
a result, the Draft Norms were abandoned and the search
for a more suitable international framework to regulate
MNCs began once again.165
Given the non-binding nature and, consequently, the
weak implementation of the Global Compact principles,
in August 2003 the United Nations Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted
to endorse the Global Compact principles in a different
151 International Labour Office, “Overview of Global Developments and Office Activities”, ILO Doc. GB.273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev.1) (1998), para.138.
152 International Labour Office, Working Party on the Social Dimension of Globalization, “Information Note on Corporate Social Responsibility and International Labour
Standards”, ILO Doc. GB286/WP/SDG/4 (2003).
153 Johnson, “Public-Private-Public Convergence” (1998) 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 291.
154Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector (2009). Available at: http://www.un.org/ar/business/pdf/Guidelines_on_UN_Business
_Cooperation.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2016].
155 Justice Nolan, “The United Nations’ Compact with Business: Hindering or Helping the Protection of Human Rights” (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal
458.
156 See UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “The effects of the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations on the
Enjoyment of Human Rights”, Res. 2001/3, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/3 (2001).
157David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights”
(2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 904.
158Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(2003). Available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/norms-Aug2003.html [Accessed 4 May 2016].
159Draft Norms (2003), para.1.
160Denis G. Arnold, “Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights” (2010) 20(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 349, 374.
161Arnold, “Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights” (2010) 20(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 349, 375.
162Arnold, “Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights” (2010) (20(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 349, 376; Weissbrodt and Kruger, “Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations” (2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 913; and Draft Norms (2003), paras 15 and 16.
163 Simon Chesterman, “Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones” (2010–11) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 321,
327.
164Larry Cata Backer, “On the Evolution of the United Nations’ ‘Protect-Respect-Remedy’ Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance
Context” (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 37, 46.
165Harmen van der Wilt, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities” (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 43, 45:
“The extension of jurisdiction to corporate entities made it onto the agenda of the 2010 Kampala Review Conference, but received only limited attention due to the strong
focus on the crime of aggression.”
244 International Company and Commercial Law Review
[2016] I.C.C.L.R., Issue 7 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
text and adopted a more proactive approach to ensure that
the principles would be taken more seriously. It did so,
by adopting the “Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterpriseswith Regard toHumanRights”.166Even though
these are not legally binding, the Draft Norms have met
with a mixed response in scholarly debate.167 They have
been described as an important restatement of existing
international human rights law by some168 and as a “lost
cause” by others.169
At European level, the Council of Europe has tried to
lay out similar standards on the basis of the
aforementioned Norms of 2003, albeit through a
non-binding instrument. Resolution 1757 (2010), among
other things, calls upon Member States to:
“7.2. Encourage the implementation of the
United Nations ‘Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and other Business enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights’ by business
entities registered within their jurisdiction;
7.3. Legislate, if necessary, to protect
individuals from corporate abuses of rights
enshrined in the Convention and in the
revised European Social Charter (ETS No.
163).”170
The situation in the EU is equally discouraging. A large
scale study carried out by De Schutter into multinationals
under EU law reiterated the failure of the mechanisms
for imposing human rights obligations on multinational
enterprises and regulating their conduct.171
Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights
In response to the failure of the Draft Norms, the UN
Sub-Commission asked the UN Secretary-General to
assign a Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) to the issue of human rights and business
enterprises.172 In 2005, the UN Secretary-General
appointed John Gerard Ruggie (co-author of the Global
Compact) as the UN SRSG with a mandate consisting of
three parts concerning human rights and business
enterprises.173 It includes:
“to identify and clarify standards of corporate
responsibility and accountability for businesses and
human rights; clarify the implications for businesses
of concepts such as ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of
influence’; develop materials and methodologies for
undertaking human rights impact assessments of the
activities of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises”.174
The main purpose of the SRSG was to establish a policy
framework to understand the responsibilities of business
enterprises in relation to human rights.175 In 2008, the
SRSG recommended a conceptual framework on business
and human rights based on three fundamental pillars:
“protect, respect and remedy” (the Ruggie Framework).176
The Ruggie Framework provides that it is
“the state’s duty to ‘protect’ against human rights
abuses by third parties, including business, through
appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication;
the corporate responsibility to ‘respect’ human
rights, which means to act with due diligence to
avoid infringing on the rights of others and to
address adverse impacts that occur; and greater
access by victims to effective ‘remedy’, both judicial
and non-judicial”.177
In 2010, the SRSG provided recommendations for the
implementation of the Ruggie Framework, which was
subsequently approved in June 2011 by the HumanRights
Council (HRC), resulting in the development of the
“Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” (the
Ruggie Principles).178 The Ruggie Framework clearly
identifies that it is ultimately the state’s responsibility to
ensure the fulfilment of human rights obligations under
international law by protecting them against abuse,
including those perpetrated byMNCs. States are therefore
required to assess, enact and enforce legislation
concerning human rights, provide companies with advice
166Draft Norms (2003).
167For a detailed discussion concerning the arguments for and against the norms, see David Kinley and Rachel Chambers, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations:
The Private Implications for Public International Law” (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 447.
168Celia Wells and Juanita Elias, “Corporate Complicity in Rights Violations” in Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005), p.151.
169David Kinley, Justine Nolan and Natalie Zerial, “The Norms are dead! Long live the Norms! The politics behind the UN Human Rights Norms for corporations” in
Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), p.459.
170 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1757 (2010), Business and Human Rights. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref
-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17903&lang=en [Accessed 4 May 2016].
171Olivier de Schutter, “The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law” in Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005), p.227.
172UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 61st Session, Agenda Item 17, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/L.87 (2005).
173 Jan Wouters and Ann-Luise Chane, “Multinational Corporations in International Law”, Working Paper No.129 (December 2013), p.15.
174 “Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises”, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN
/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpIndex.aspx [Accessed 4 May 2016].
175Bhandary Leeladhara Mangalpady, “Relationship between Business Corporations and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis” (15 June 2011), SSRN. Available at: http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987032 [Accessed 4 May 2016].
176 “Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises”, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN
/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpIndex.aspx [Accessed 4 May 2016].
177United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, “Protect,
Respect, and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights”, UN DocE/CN.4/2006/97 (February 2006). See “The UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework
for Business and Human Rights”, available at: http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework
.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2016].
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and guidance on issues of human rights, and actively
encourage respect for human rights by corporate
associates.179
The second part of the Ruggie Framework highlights
corporate responsibility to respect all forms of
international human rights, and this includes both in terms
of “social expectation” and in “prudential risk
management”.180 Businesses are therefore required to
“avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights
impacts … and address such impacts when they occur”,
and to “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their operations,
products or services by their business relationships”.181
Corporate responsibility therefore differs considerably
from state duty. States not only have to respect human
rights, but must also ensure their protection and
fulfilment, whereas companies only have to ensure
responsible business practices to avoid infringing human
rights. The Ruggie Principles recommend businesses to
implement:
“(a) a policy commitment to meet their responsibility
to respect human rights; (b) a human rights due
diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and
account for how they address their impacts on human
rights; (c) processes to enable the remediation of
any adverse human rights they cause or to which
they contribute”.182
The SRSG, however, rejected the idea of compiling a
complete list of human rights for business enterprises to
observe and respect, and instead stated that “business
enterprises can have an impact on virtually the entire
spectrum of internationally recognised human rights”,
and thus their “responsibility to respect applies to all such
rights”.183
The final part of the Ruggie Framework provides that
access to remedy must be available to all victims of
human rights abuse. Thus, states must provide a
“mechanism to investigate, punish, and redress abuses”,184
and business enterprises are recommended to “develop
and deploy grievance mechanisms for alleged human
rights abuses”.185
The response to the Ruggie Principles has been
equivocal. On the one hand, supporters of the Ruggie
Framework have openly praised the consultative process
for effectively bringing to light issues of human rights186
and lauded the clear distinction between the duty of states
and the responsibility of corporations.Moreover, business
enterprises which have consistently fought against binding
obligations of human rights in the past and opposed all
previous attempts at regulating corporate behaviour have
welcomed this new initiative. Furthermore, states have
responded positively to the Ruggie Framework andmade
efforts to implement the Ruggie Principles at both
domestic and regional levels. On the other hand, NGOs
have criticised the Ruggie Framework for merely
imposing non-binding obligations on businesses.
Additionally, critics have also condemned the
overemphasis on processes at the expense of substance.187
While the Ruggie Principles are appealing, they do not
constitute an international instrument, nor do they create
binding legal obligations. Instead, they simply clarify
existing international human rights standards directed at
states, and provide guidance on how to put them into
action.188 It therefore remains the states’ duty to protect
human rights, whileMNCs simply have to respect human
rights. MNCs therefore do not have any binding legal
obligations concerning human rights at an international
level and thus remain regulated only at a domestic level.
This allows them to continue exploiting less developed
countries with weak regulations in order to evade their
human rights obligations.
MNCs are indeed discernible entities at a global level,
but the inability of domestic and international laws to
grapple with these entities has resulted in a legal vacuum.
It is perhaps therefore time to find an alternative approach
to regulate their conduct. Thus far, legal discourse has
centred on the possibility of establishing a binding code
of conduct to regulateMNCs,189 the adoption of a Charter
of Human Rights to govern the activities of MNCs190 and
179United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General, “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”, UN DocE/CN.4/2006/97 (February 2006). See “The UN ‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy’ Framework for Business and Human Rights”.
180United Nations Special Representative, “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”, UN DocE/CN.4/2006/97 (February 2006), p.12. See “The UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework for Business and Human Rights”, p.12.
181UNHRC, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John
Ruggie” (2001) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, para.13.
182UNHRC, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, John Ruggie” (2001) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, para.15.
183UNHRC, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, John Ruggie” (2001) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, para.12.
184United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General, “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”, UNDocE/CN.4/2006/97 (February 2006), p.12. See “The UN ‘Protect,
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186 Susan Ariel Aaronson and Ian Higham, “‘Re-righting Business’: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards for Transnational
Firms” (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 333, 336.
187Wouters and Chane, “Multinational Corporations in International Law”, Working Paper No.129 (December 2013), p.17.
188United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General, “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”, UNDocE/CN.4/2006/97 (February 2006), p.12. See “The UN ‘Protect,
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189See Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Special Session (7–18 March 1983 and 9–20 May
1983) UN Doc.E/C.10/1982/6 (1986).
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a global institute to supervise the practices of MNCs.191
Despite some merit in these recommendations, progress
has virtually been non-existent owing to difficulties in
establishing a locus in international law to regulate the
activities of MNCs. Overall, international attempts thus
far have been unsuccessful and cannot compel MNCs to
behave in a socially responsible manner. Owing to the
failures of international law, the only way to hold MNCs
accountable for their abusive practices is to impose legal
personality on them at an international level.
On 26 June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council
decided to endorse three core Guiding Principles in
Resolution 17/4. The Guiding Principles were developed
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, and consist
of the following principles: (1) states owe a duty to protect
human rights through a set of foundational and operational
principles; (2) transnational corporations and other
business enterprises have a corporate responsibility to
respect human rights; and finally, (3) states have a duty
to provide access to effective legal remedies through
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.192 The Guiding
Principles apply to all states and to all business
enterprises, both transnational and others, regardless of
their size, sector, location, ownership or structure.
The Guiding Principles are to be realised on the basis
of specific foundational principles. For example, in
relation to protecting human rights, the guidance suggests
that: (1) states are required to protect against human rights
abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third
parties, including business enterprises. This requires
taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish
and redress such abuse through effective policies,
legislation, regulations and adjudication; and (2) states
are required to set out clearly the expectation that all
business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or
jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their
operations.193
To implement the Guiding Principles, Resolution 17/4
establishes an annual Forum on Business and Human
Rights under the guidance and auspices of the Working
Group on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises.194The Forum
on Business and Human Rights meets yearly to discuss
trends and challenges in the implementation of the
Guiding Principles, and to promote dialogue and
co-operation on issues linked to business and human
rights, including challenges faced in particular sectors,
operational environments or in relation to specific rights
or groups, as well as identifying good practices.195
The Human Rights Council has asked that the Forum
shall be open to the participation of States, United Nations
mechanisms, bodies and specialised agencies, funds and
programmes, intergovernmental organisations, regional
organisations and mechanisms in the field of human
rights, national human rights institutions and other
relevant bodies, transnational corporations and other
business enterprises, business associations, labour unions,
academics and experts in the field of business and human
rights, representatives of indigenous peoples and
non-governmental organisations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council.196
In assessing the effectiveness of the Guiding Principles,
in 2012 the United Nations Secretary-General identified
the lack of capacity among all relevant actors as one of
the key obstacles to advancing the business and human
rights agenda and the implementation of the Guiding
Principles.197
In more recent years, discussions at the UN level
focussed on new possibilities for co-operation between
the United Nations and multinational corporations. One
of the goals of the 2013 Forum on Business and Human
Rights198 was to offer an opportunity for capacity
building.199
The 2013 Forum identified a number of challenges,
including the unwillingness of host governments to
recognise human rights challenges and to work with
companies and representatives of civil society groups to
implement these initiatives, as well as the lack of
knowledge of labour and human rights standards among
producers, including the Guiding Principles, and the
importance of integrating human rights and due diligence.
It emphasised the role of the business sector in
harmonising their safeguarding policies and requesting
that states adopt national implementation plans. It further
suggested that the regional systems could align their
sanctions with the Guiding Principles’ expectations of
companies in relation to the provision of adequate
remedies, given that a weak rule of law in some countries
continues to impede access to an effective remedy.
Finally, representatives suggested: (1) more commitment
of states through national action plans; (2) the engagement
of regional organisations with the view of mainstreaming
191K. Alexander, “The Need for Efficient International Financial Regulation and the Role of a Global Supervisor” (2001) 5(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 52;
K. Alexander, R. Dhumale and J. Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: Regulating Systemic Risk to Promote Financial Stability (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
192Office of the UN High Commissioner, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, respect and remedy’ Framework”
(2011). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2016].
193United Nations “Protect, respect and remedy’ Framework” (2011), p.3.
194Human Rights Council, “Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises”, Resolution 17/4 (6 July 2011).
195Resolution 17/4 (2011), para.13.
196Resolution 17/4 (2011), para.14.
197Human Rights Council, “Contribution of the United Nations system as a whole to the advancement of the business and human rights agenda and the dissemination and
implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, Doc. No.A/HRC/21/21 (2 July 2012). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies
/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-21_en.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2016].
198 2013 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, proceedings of the sessions, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages
/2013ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx [Accessed 4 May 2016].
199Human Rights Council, Summary of discussions of the Forum on Business and Human Rights, prepared by the Chairperson, Makarim Wibisono, UN Doc.
A/HRC/FBHR/2013/4 (2–4 December 2013). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession2/ListOfReferences.pdf [Accessed 4May 2016].
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the Guiding Principles into their charters, policies and
justice and accountability systems; (3) integrating the
Guiding Principles in the post-2015 development agenda
and into the work of global institutions and the United
Nations system; (4) the creation of a global fund for
capacity building; and (5) an adjusted focus of the work
of the Working Group.
Overall, the current framework concerning the
responsibilities of multinational corporations seems weak
and vague, given that the soft law instruments that are
currently in place do not impose binding obligations but
merely suggest principles of good practice and codes of
conduct, which are voluntary in nature. The documents
and initiatives presented in this article represent forms of
soft law with limited opportunities for effective
enforcement. It is further argued that there is a strong
clash between the non-binding nature of the current
framework (most notably the UN Guiding Principles)
and the binding character of international human rights
law. It is, of course, important to emphasise that certain
specialised treaties of a multilateral nature impose direct
obligations on corporations, such as the 1969 Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless,
these treaties are relevant in isolated incidents concerning
liability for large-scale catastrophes and do not represent
any set of coherent legal principles in relation to
accountability for multinational corporations.
Issues concerning the regulation of MNCs have
predominantly resulted from human rights abuses. The
previous section traced the development of international
law to determine to what extent MNCs were currently
regulated at an international level. It was revealed that
MNCs are regulated only by “soft law” initiatives which
cannot compel them to adhere to principles of human
rights. The following section proposes an international
personality for the international company in order to hold
MNCs accountable for human rights. Additionally, a
further proposal is to codify the extant Ruggie Principles
at an international level into a binding treaty in order to
hold MNCs accountable for human rights.
The way forward
As a way forward, we suggest that in order to holdMNCs
accountable for human rights abuses, a new framework
is required, involving the concept of an international
company with an international legal personality to close
the current regulatory gaps. Indeed, in order to establish
an international company, it is prudent to first facilitate
the recognition of its corporate personality and duties at
an international level.200 The United Nations is a suitable
intergovernmental organisation to advance a model
framework for the realisation of this concept. It is hoped
that this concept might perhaps be more successful than
all previous attempts by the United Nations to govern the
activities of MNCs in relation to human rights.
The personality of the international company will be
both distinct and separate from all other international
companies, and companies in general, but it will remain
associated with its subsidiaries. The proposed framework
will describe the concept of global corporations.
Furthermore, the liability of a parent company in relation
to its shareholding in a subsidiary will be defined in the
context of global corporations. However, this liability
will differ from individual shareholders liability at
domestic level. Additionally, the requirement for a
disclosure system for global corporations at an
international level will be addressed in the framework.
While Member States will have the option, they will be
encouraged to incorporate the international company
provisions into their domestic laws.
States that choose to adopt the international company
framework will require any companies that satisfy the
global corporation criteria, and wishing to operate in
domestic territory, to obtain the status of an international
company prior to their operations. The United Nations
will support this framework by employing a global
registry for international corporations. The body charged
with registering global corporations will issue
international company certificates and simultaneously
maintain a paper trail of the operations of all registered
international companies. All laws pertaining to the
international company will be imposed at a domestic
level; however, a provision will be incorporated into the
framework for a panel of experts to deal solely with issues
of interpretation and application of the framework. The
proposed framework is intended to deal with regulatory
gaps caused by the operations of global companies and
therefore does not address matters of internal regulation.
A recent report summarising the findings of a research
project carried out by the University of Liverpool
identified the following barriers to creating a new
international mechanism to address corporate harms: the
economic and political power of corporations; the
imposition of legal restrictions on corporations could have
the effect of imposing an effective social wage on weaker
economies; the structure of the modern corporation as
200This will be similar to the provisions of the European Company (Societas Europaea or SE) Regulation 2004. The EU Statute intervenes in matters which are essential
to enable companies to maximise their potential and leaves other matters within national remit as they were before the statute: “The purpose of the SE is to meet the challenges
of globalised markets and to achieve the aim of a common market in Europe. The statute gives companies operating in more than one Member State the option of being
established with a European corporate identity and operating with one set of rules and a unified management system or even as a single merged company. Under art.2 and
Title II of the Regulation, there are five exclusive ways of forming an SE. Each alternative reflects the basic requirement that a cross-border or international element must
exist. Firstly, existing public limited-liability companies can merge to form an SE, provided that at least two of the companies involved come from different Member States.
Secondly, companies—both public and private limited-liability companies—can form a holding SE if more than 50% of the capital of each of the promoting companies is
contributed and at least two of the promoting companies are from different Member States or have had a subsidiary or branch in another Member State for at least two years.
Thirdly, with the same condition for cross-border activity applying, a subsidiary SE may be formed as a joint venture company. Fourthly, an existing public limited-liability
company can be converted into an SE, provided that it has had a subsidiary in another Member State for at least two years. Fifthly and finally, an SE itself can establish
subsidiary SEs. The SE is subject to, and governed by, the national laws of the Member State of its domicile.” See CMS, “Societas Europaea”, p.4. Available at: http://www
.cmslegal.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/74b1540e-27c1-43fa-ac4d-3439dbb90f84/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e24c0ec3-6cc0-4438-a5e6-346dd833e798
/CMS_Societas_Europaea_May2011.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2016].
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“the biggest obstacle to any traditional mechanism” of
corporate accountability; distinguishing the responsible
party without a direct delegation of authority between the
host state and the corporation; and the lack of expertise
in the ECtHR and other regional courts to deal with
corporate violations of human rights.201Given the reasons
outlined in this article, and the recent research findings
relating to potential mechanisms to address corporate
harms, the authors suggest that one of the most prevalent
issues in this regard is how to fill the accountability gap.
What needs to be considered, therefore, is whether
international courts have the capacity and jurisdiction to
address corporate human rights issues.
Owing to its structure into specialised chambers, the
International Court of Justice could support the idea of
having a dedicated chamber looking into corporate human
rights violations. According to art.26 of the ICJ Statute,
of which the jurisdiction is recognised by 72 state parties,
“the Court may from time to time form one or more
chambers, composed of three or more judges as the
Court may determine, for dealing with particular
categories of cases; for example, labour cases and
cases relating to transit and communications”.
It is therefore possible for the ICJ to create a “human
rights chamber for corporate responsibility”. A serious
drawback, however, is that only states are eligible to apply
to the ICJ, as the court has no jurisdiction to examine
complaints by individuals, non-governmental
organisations, corporations or any other private entity.
Even in the unlikely event that states agreed to take the
responsibility for the actions of multinational corporations
based in their territory, the court’s “compulsory
jurisdiction”, namely that both parties must agree to the
court rendering a decision, would mean that states will
be able to opt out from recognising the court’s jurisdiction
to consider claims.
On the other hand, an approach that seems to be more
favourable in scholarly debate is the extension of the 1998
Rome Statute in the International Criminal Court (ICC)
to apply to corporate, as well as natural, persons. At
present, 123 countries are states parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court; therefore it
has a much wider influence. Nevertheless, the Rome
Statute is not provided with jurisdiction to try legal
persons for offences under the Statute. According to
art.25(1) of the 1998 Rome Statute, “[t]he Court shall
have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this
Statute”.
This means that the ICC can only criminally prosecute
natural persons, and not legal entities such as
corporations. It is therefore suggested that art.25 of the
Rome Statute needs to be amended in order to allow the
court jurisdiction to try legal persons, although
commentators suggest that incorporating into the Rome
Statute the approach in the Conventions of recognising
criminal, civil or administrative redress for corporate
wrongs is problematic, as the ICC does not have the
capacity to directly enforce non-criminal remedies.202 The
unavailability of restitution and compensation in this
regard would defeat the purpose of having the ICC
involved in claims concerning human rights violations
by multinational corporations.
Furthermore, the ICC deals with the most grave and
serious human rights abuses and crimes of concern to the
international community. Holding corporations
accountable for human rights violations would not fall
within the court’s mandate unless the Rome Statute is
revised and efforts are made to bring corporate
accountability into the court’s agenda.
Reliance on non-binding principles such as those
endorsed by the United Nations in 2011 (Guiding
Principles on Business andHumanRights) and previously
by the OECD (Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises)
does not provide an effective solution to the problem of
corporate responsibility, as voluntary adherence to the
non-binding standards jeopardises the need for
implementation. It could be suggested that a binding
international agreement is created, enshrining norms of
corporate responsibility, which could hold companies
accountable for their human rights abuses. Nevertheless,
enforcement and remedial action in international law, as
described above, is often problematic.
The international community should invest further on
strengthening domestic legislation and bringing it up to
standard with international norms of corporate
responsibility—under the auspices of a UN commissioner
empowered to launch investigations and oversee
implementation at regular intervals. As noted in a 2008
Report to the Human Rights Council by the UN Special
Representative, the failure of companies to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights
“can subject companies to the courts of public
opinion—comprising employees, communities,
consumers, civil society, as well as investors—and
occasionally to charges in actual courts. Whereas
governments define the scope of legal compliance,
the broader scope of the responsibility to respect is
defined by social expectations—as part of what is
sometimes called a company’s social licence to
operate”.203
The UN Human Rights Council has also emphasised the
need for international efforts to close the current
regulatory gaps by stating:
201 Stéfanie Khoury and David Whyte, “New Mechanisms for Accountability for Corporate Violations of Human Rights” (2015). Available at: https://www.liv.ac.uk/media
/livacuk/sociology-social-policy-and-criminology/research/New,Mechanisms,for,Accountability.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2016].
202Kathryn Haigh, “Extending the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction to Corporations: Overcoming Complementarity Concerns” (2008) 14(1) Australian Journal
of Human Rights 199.
203Geneviève Paul and Judith Schönsteiner, “Transitional Justice and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” in Sabine Michalowski (ed.), Corporate
Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p.73.
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“Weak national legislation and implementation
cannot effectively mitigate the negative impact of
globalisation on vulnerable economies, fully realise
the benefits of globalisation or derive maximally the
benefits of activities of Transnational corporations
and other business enterprises and that therefore
efforts to bridge governance gaps at the national,
regional and international levels are necessary.”204
However, the implementation and more importantly the
ratification of UN resolutions once formulated and
approved are notoriously slow and require a willingness
on behalf of the Member States to implement legislation
at the domestic level. A key issue in dealing with the
potential impact of multinational companies in respect
of potential human rights abuses is the relationship
between the law and the juristic person that is the body
corporate. In considering this relationship, particularly
in respect of the equitable treatment of the natural and
juristic person, a number of potential approaches may be
considered. The Treaty on the Function of the European
Union (TFEU, 2007) brings with it a number of clear
statements in respect of the treatment of the natural person
and the juristic person. Key elements of this treaty include
art.18, which, in dealing with principles of
non-discrimination in respect of the European citizen,
specifically prohibits “discrimination on grounds of
nationality”. Within this article it is clear that the
principles of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality
will apply to the natural person and has been tested in a
number of cases (see Reyners v Belgian205; andGrzelczyk
v Cen t re Pub l i c d ’A i d e S o c i a l e
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve206). A further extension of
this principle to the juristic person was achieved through
the landmark cases of Commission of the European
Communities v France (270/83)207 and R. v Inland
Revenue Commissioners Ex p. Commerzbank AG
(Commerzbank).208 These cases brought together what is
under European law equal treatment of the “person” both
in respect of equitable treatment and equal obligation
across what is a complex legal and political environment.
While the literature concerning the consideration of the
treatment of the natural and juristic person within the
model of the EU is significant and on the whole
comprehensive, parity of treatment in respect of certain
criminal acts for which liability rests with the natural or
juristic person is not so readily achieved. Within English
law, attempts to link the acts of the juristic person to the
responsibilities of the natural person are fraught with
difficulties. Since Denning’s statement in HL Bolton
Engineering Co Ltd v TJ Graham& Sons Ltd,209 attempts
to liken the functioning of the juristic person to the organs
of the natural person have proved difficult to implement.
As organisations become increasingly complex, the
individual “guiding mind” of the juristic person is not
encapsulatedwithin a single decision-maker and therefore
the opportunity to secure conviction against the juristic
person is difficult and in some cases impossible, as was
the case with the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in
1991.210
This case and others, such as the Southall train crash
in 1997 and the Paddington Rail crash in 1999, in which
a total of 38 people were killed and in excess of 600
people were injured, prompted the UK Government to
enact the CorporateManslaughter andHomicideAct 2007
(the Act).211 Although commentators have individually
questioned the relative value of the Act,212, the clear intent
is to move away from the necessity to identify a single
individual as the “guiding mind” to the company itself,
and therefore it is the company as an entire entity on
which the Act is focussed. While the Act itself has not
been sufficiently tested to determine its efficacy in
complex cases involving many individuals and complex
layers of corporate activities, it does in the opinion of the
authors offer a potential template by which the juristic
person may be held accountable for abuses within the
ambit of human rights. By directing legislation towards
the entire company rather than seeking an individual
decision-maker or company agent on to whom the entire
blame may be placed, nation states may seek to hold the
juristic person as a single entity responsible for its actions,
and while the limitation of the Act in the UK prevents
individual directors of the company from facing sanction,
penalties imposed in the form of fines may present an
opportunity for a degree of restitution for those natural
persons who have suffered as a consequence of the actions
of the juristic person.
It has been argued that MNCs are distinct from
domestic companies, but they have nevertheless been
operating at a domestic level in a regulatory vacuum.We
have proposed an innovative international company
framework to plug the existing regulatory gaps and hold
MNCs accountable for human rights. We suggest that
UN co-operation is paramount for the realisation of an
international company with an international legal
personality. The international company framework will
certainly benefit host states from less developed nations
with weak regulations. While the idea of an international
company may be efficacious, academics have already
204Human Rights Council, Preamble to Resolution 8/7, Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises.
205Reyners v Belgian (2/74) [1974] E.C.R. 631; [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305 ECJ.
206Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (C-184/99) [2001] E.C.R. I-6193 ; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 19; [2002] I.C.R. 566 ECJ.
207Commission of the European Communities v France (270/83) [1986] E.C.R. 273; [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 401 ECJ.
208R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex p. Commerzbank AG (Commerzbank) (C-330/91) [1993] E.C.R. I-4017; [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 457.
209Denning LJ in HL Bolton Engineering Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 159; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 804; (1956) 100 S.J. 816 CA.
210R. v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72; [1991] Crim. L.R. 695 CCC .
211Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19/pdfs/ukpga_20070019_en.pdf [Accessed 4 May
2016].
212 F.B. Wright, “Criminal Liability of Directors and Senior Managers of Deaths at Work” [December 2007] Criminal Law Review 949; and R. Gobert, “The Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: Thirteen Years in the Making but Was It Worth the Wait?” (2008) 71(3) Modern Law Review 413.
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proposed this reform in the past and it has failed to
materialise owing to the absence of an international legal
personality for global corporations.
Conclusion
As a consequence of the inability of both international
and domestic laws to address the concept of MNCs,
regulatory gaps have inevitably emerged in the area of
human rights. MNCs pose serious challenges to the
traditional legal frameworks owing to their economic
relationships surpassing the control of national states and
operating outside the control of national laws. MNCs are
distinct from domestic companies, but they have
nevertheless been operating at a domestic level in a
regulatory vacuum. This method of operation has resulted
in negative consequences for human rights across the
globe. The transnational nature ofMNCs and the absence
of an appropriate regulatory framework to govern their
practices require an innovative framework at an
international level to regulate these practices. The
proposal is to introduce an international company with
an international personality to plug the existing regulatory
gaps and hold MNCs accountable for human rights
violations. While the idea of an international company
may be efficacious, many organisations and scholars have
already proposed this reform in the past; regrettably, it
has failed to materialise owing to the absence of an
international legal personality for global corporations.
It is the authors’ view that it would be plausible for the
UN to formulate a new multilateral treaty encouraging
domestic judicial restructuring in order to correct any
systemic weaknesses with regard to accountability and
due diligence, provide accessible redress mechanisms,
and introduce more effective sanctions for companies
that engage in human rights violations. This could be
achieved through the codification of Principle No.2 of
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
For this to take effect, the United Nations must intensify
their efforts in convincing governments to adhere to a
multinational treaty that will not merely codify binding
duties and obligations, but will also offer the opportunity
for systemic restructuring.
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